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Abstract 
All the ongoing proposals for a reform of data protection regulations, 
both in the U.S. and Europe, are still focused on the purpose 
limitation principle and the “notice and choice” model. This approach 
is inadequate in the present Big Data context. The paper suggests a 
revision of the existing model and proposes the provision of a subset 
of rules for Big Data processing, which is based on the opt-out model 
and on a deeper level of control by data protection authorities.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, the debate surrounding data protection 
and privacy has focused on the future wave of new regulations. 
Driven by the Web 2.0 environment and the economy of data, 
private companies and governments have become even more 
data-centric. However, the high demand for personal 
information, the complexity of the new tools of analysis and 
the increasing numbers of sources of data collection, have 
generated an environment in which the “data barons” [1] (i.e. 
big companies, government agencies, intermediaries) [2] have 
a control over digital information which is no longer 
counterbalanced by the user’s self-determination. Nevertheless, 
all the ongoing proposals for a reform of data protection 
regulations, both in the U.S. and Europe, are still focused on 
the traditional main pillars of the so called “fourth generation” 
of  data protection laws [3] [4], which are represented by the 
purpose limitation principle and the “notice and choice” 
model.1 This kind of approach seems to be inadequate in the 
present Big Data context and in a digital world characterized 
by an asymmetric distribution of the control over information. 
It is also inadequate in a digital economy where users accept 
not having an effective negotiation of their personal 
                                                          
1 In the U.S. the traditional approach, based on different sectorial regulations, 
underestimated the role played by user’s choice, adopting a marked-oriented 
approach; nevertheless the recent guidelines adopted by the U.S. 
administrations seems to adopt a different approach, reinforcing self-
determination, although these new set of principles are still unimplemented. 
See The White House, A Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A 
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global 
Digital Economy, 2012, pp. 47-48, retrieved February, 28th, 2014 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.  
information, due to market concentration and social and 
technological lock-ins.2 
For these reasons, it is necessary to re-consider the existing 
data protection legal framework and define new models, which 
better address the various issues of this new digital 
environment. Different proposals have been advanced by legal 
scholars, which focus on privacy by design [6] [7], contextual 
privacy [8], data uses [9] and other combined solutions. 
Nevertheless, many of these proposals adopt a holistic 
approach to the problem. In contrast, this article suggests the 
adoption of different solutions for situations in which the role 
of the consent-based model is outdated and the contexts in 
which the traditional model based on opt-in can be preserved. 
In doing so, the experience from the past should not be 
forgotten. In many cases, the first answer given by the legal 
system to new technological and social revolutions [1] is 
represented by the introduction of new ad hoc rules. 
Nevertheless, the lack of knowledge of past experiences makes 
it difficult to find adequate answers to the new questions that 
technology poses.  
In the light of the above, this article reconsiders the history 
of data protection and its evolution from mainframe to Big 
Data, in order to give an answer to the contemporary problems 
of privacy and data protection. This is not a mere cultural 
interest in this historical perspective, since there are evidently a 
numbers of similarities between the context of the 50’s-60’s 
and the present. For this reason the analysis of that experience 
can offer elements to address the new challenges and to re-
think the data protection framework. 
 
2. The Reasons of Data Protection and the First 
Generations of Regualtions 
Before considering the different reasons that induce the law 
to protect personal information, it should be noticed that 
European legal systems do not recognize the same broad notion 
of the right to privacy, which exists in U.S. case laws. At the 
same time, data protection laws in the European countries do 
not draw their origins from the European idea of privacy and 
its related case law. 
With regard to the first aspect (and in brief), in the U.S. the 
right to privacy covers a broad area that goes from 
informational privacy to the right of self-determination in 
private life decisions [10][11][12][13][14][15]. On the other 
                                                          
2 See below para. 3. 
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hand, in European countries this right mainly focuses on the 
first aspect and is related to the activities of the media. 
With regard to the second aspect, it is worth pointing out 
that the European data protection regulations, since their 
origins in the late 60’s, have focused on the information 
regarding individuals, without distinguishing between their 
public or private nature [16]. The right to privacy and data 
protection do not concern the same aspects, even if they are 
entangled and connected in many senses: there is only a partial 
overlapping, given that private facts are also referred to 
individuals, but at the same time a lot of personal information 
is publicly available and, for this reason, it does not fall into the 
field of the right to privacy. However, the legal issues related 
to the protection of personal information had a more recent 
recognition in law, both in the U.S. and Europe [3][4][17], 
dating from the 60’s, whereas the primitive era of the right to 
privacy was at the end of 19th century when the penny press 
assumed a significant role in limiting the privacy of the people 
of upper classes [18][19].3 For these reasons, our analysis 
should start from the computer revolution of the late  50’s and 
not one century before, when the first decision on 
informational privacy were adopted in Europe , independently 
from the U.S. legal doctrine and before the milestone article of 
Warren and Brandeis [19]. 
The first generations of data protection regulations were 
characterized by a national approach: regulations were adopted 
at different times and were different in the extension of the 
protection they provided and the remedies they offered.  
The notion of data protection was originally based on the 
idea of control over information, as demonstrated by the 
literature of that period [20][21]. At that time, the migration 
from dusty paper archives to computer memories was a 
Copernican revolution which, for the first time in history, 
permitted the aggregation of information about every citizen 
previously spread over different archives. For this reason, the 
first regulations represented the answers given by legislators to 
the rising concern of citizens about social control as the 
introduction of big mainframe computers gave governments 
and big companies the opportunity to collect and manage large 
amount of personal information [22]. 
In that period, people were afraid of being visible like a 
gold fish in a glass bowl [23][24][25]. In the mainframe era a 
concentration of information, which was massive for the time, 
was in the hands of few entities, which were able to support the 
investments required by the new mainframe equipment. This 
concentration was also induced by the centralized architecture 
of mainframes, with their single central processing unit and a 
main memory in which all the computational power was placed 
and made available to other specialized terminals, which were 
connected. 
The solution given by the legal systems was the 
opportunity to have a sort of counter-control over the collected 
data. The purpose of the regulations was not to spread and 
democratize power over information but to increase the level of 
transparency about data processing and guarantee the right to 
access to information. Citizens felt they were monitored and 
                                                          
3 See Trib. civ. Seine, 16 giugno 1858, D.P., 1858.3.62. 
the law gave them the opportunity to know who controlled 
them, which kind of data were collected and for which 
purposes.  
Technically speaking, a fundamental element of these new 
regulations was the mandatory notification to independent 
authorities of the creation of every new database, necessary in 
order to know who had control over information. Another key 
component of the first legal frameworks is the rights to access, 
which allowed citizens to ask the data owners about the way in 
which the information was used and, consequently, about their 
exercise of power over information. Finally, the entire picture 
was completed by the creation of ad hoc public authorities, to 
guarantee the respect and enforcement of citizen’s rights, 
control over the data owners and the reaction against abuses.  
In this model there was no space for individual consent, due 
to the economic context of that period. The collection of 
information was mainly made by public entities for purposes 
related to public interests, so it was mandatory and there was 
no space of autonomy in terms of negotiation about personal 
information. At the same time, personal information did not 
have an economic value for the private sector, as the data about 
clients and suppliers were only used for operational functions 
regarding the execution of the activities of the company.  
Nevertheless, there was also another element that 
contributed to exclude the role of self-determination: the lack 
of knowledge, the extreme difficulty for ordinary people to 
understand how the mainframes worked. The computer 
mainframes were a sort of modern god, with sacral attendants, 
a selected number of technicians that was able to use this new 
equipment. In this scenario, it did not make sense to give 
citizens the chance to choose, since they were unable to 
understand the way in which the date was processed. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that all these aspects 
(concentration of information, centralized architecture, 
complexity of data processing) are now present again in the 
Big Data context, hence the practical relevance of this past 
experience, which will be more extensively considered in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
3. The New Generations of Regulations and the 
Economic Value of Personal Information  
The following period – during the 80’s and 90’s – was the 
era of distributed computers: now many people had the chance 
to buy a personal computer to collect and process information. 
The big mainframe computer “became” the small desktop 
personal computer, with a relatively low cost, and 
consequently the computational capacity was no longer an 
exclusive privilege of governments and big companies, but 
became accessible to many other entities and to consumers. 
At that time, we also witnessed to another transformation 
represented by the advent of direct marketing. This was based 
on customer profiling and necessarily required an extensive 
data collection to apply data mining software and to suggest to 
any single consumer the commercial proposal that was most 
suitable for him or her. This was a new form of data processing 
driven by new purposes: information was no longer collected 
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to support supply chains, logistics and orders, but to sell the 
best product to every single user. From this perspective, the 
data subject became the focus of the process and the 
information referred to him or her assumes an economic and 
business value, given its role in sales. 
These changes of the technological and business 
frameworks created new requests from society to legislators: 
since personal data have become an economic and strategic 
asset of companies, citizens wanted to have the chance to 
negotiate their personal data and gain something in return.  
Since the new generations of the European data protection 
laws put the personal information in the context of fundamental 
rights [26][27], the main goal of these regulations was to 
satisfy the economic interest to have a free flow of personal 
data to boost the economy at large and especially the digital 
economy. This is also affirmed by the Directive 95/46/EC, 
which represents at the same time the general framework and 
the synthesis of this second wave of data protection laws.4 
Nevertheless the roots of data protection still remained in the 
ground of personality rights and, for this reason, the European 
approach is less market-oriented  than in other legal systems 
and it recognizes the fundamental role of public authorities in 
protecting the individual against unwilled or unfair 
exploitations of his or her personal information for market 
purposes. 
The theoretical model of fundamental rights, based on self-
determination, and the rising data-driven economy highlighted 
the important role played by user consent in data processing 
[17][28].5 Consent is not only the expression of choice about 
the use of a personality right made by third parties, but is also 
the instrument to negotiate the economic value of personal 
information [29]. In this new data-driven economy users 
cannot be put aside and personal data cannot be exploited for 
business purposes without any involvement of data subjects: it 
is necessary that data subjects become part of the negotiation, 
since data are no longer used mainly by government agencies 
for public purposes, but also by private companies for 
monetary revenues [30]. 
Nevertheless, an effective self-determination about data 
processing, both in terms of protection and economic 
exploitation of personality rights, cannot be obtained without 
adequate and prior notice, which describes how the data are 
processed and the purposes of data processing. For these 
reasons, the new generation of data protection laws has added a 
new layer represented by the “notice and consent” model [31] 
to the existing paradigm based on transparency and access.6 
                                                          
4 The EU Directive 95/46/EC has this bivalent nature, since it was written on 
the basis of the existing national data protection laws, in order to harmonize 
them, but at the same time it also provided a new set of rules. See the recitals 
in the preamble to the Directive 95/46/EC. 
5 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02), 
art. 8, OJEU, 30 March 2010, C83/389. See also Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
15 Decmber 1983, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1984, p. 419. 
6 With regard to personal information collected by public entities, in various 
cases the Directive 95/45/EC allows data collection without the consent of 
data subject; however, the notice to data subjects is necessary also in these 
cases. See Articles 7, 8 and 10, Directive 95/46/EC. 
Finally, it is important to notice that during the 80’s and 
90’s the level of data analysis that was possible was still 
limited and users were able to understand the correlation 
between data collection and related purposes of data processing 
(e.g. profiling users). So, at that time, informed consent and 
self-determination were really synonyms; this would not be the 
case in the future Big Data era. 
 
4. The Future Generations of Regulations in a Context 
Characterized by Big Data and Big Players   
The present Bid Data era is different from the previous 
period both in terms of economic and technological context, 
with direct consequences on the adequacy of the legal model 
adopted to protect personal information.  
The new environment is mainly digital and is characterized 
by an increasing concentration of information in the hands of a 
few entities, both publican and private. The role played by 
specific subjects in the generation of data flows is the principal 
reason for this concentration. Governments and big private 
companies collect huge amounts of data while performing their 
daily activities. This bulk of information represents a strategic 
and economically relevant asset, since the management of large 
databases enables these entities to assume the role of 
gatekeepers with regard to the information that can be 
extracted from the datasets, by limiting access to the data, 
perhaps to specific subjects only or to circumscribed parts of 
the entire collection, or by keeping it completely closed.  
Not only governments and big private companies acquire 
this power, but also the intermediaries in information flows 
(e.g. search engines, Internet providers, credit report agencies, 
marketing companies), which do not generate information, but 
play a key role in circulating it. 
There are also different cases in which information is 
accessible to the public, both in raw and processed form. This 
happens with regard to open data sets made available by 
government agencies, information held in public registries, 
data contained in reports, studies and other communications 
made by private companies and, finally, online user-generated 
contents, which represent a relevant and increasing portion of 
the information available online. 
The concurrent effect of all these different sources only 
apparently diminishes the concentration of power over 
information, as access to information is not equivalent to 
knowledge. A large amount of data creates knowledge if the 
holders have the adequate interpretation tools to select relevant 
information, to reorganize it, to place the data in a systematic 
context and if there are people with the skills to define the 
design of the research and give an interpretation to the results 
generated by Big Data analytics. 
Without these skills, data only produces confusion and less 
knowledge in the end, with information interpreted in an 
incomplete or biased way. 
In the Big Data context, the availability of data is not 
sufficient. It is also necessary to have the adequate human and 
computing resources to manage it. For this reason, control over 
2014 ASE BIGDATA/SOCIALCOM/CYBERSECURITY Conference, Stanford University, May 27-31, 2014
©ASE 2014 ISBN: 978-1-62561-000-3 3
 
 
information does not only regard limited access data, but can 
also concern open data, over which the information 
intermediaries create an added value by means of their 
instruments of analysis. 
Because only few entities are able to invest heavily in 
equipment and research, the dynamics described above 
enhance the concentration of power over information and are 
increased by the new expansion of Big Data and its global 
dimension. 
Under many aspects, this new environment resembles the 
origins of data processing, when in the mainframe era 
technologies were held by a few entities and data processing 
was too complex to be understood by data subjects. Could this 
suggest that in the future the scenario will change again in a 
sort of “distributed Big Data analytics”, as it happened in the 
change from mainframe to personal computer? Probably not. 
The new “data barons” do not base their position only on 
expensive hardware and software, which may become cheaper 
in the future. Neither is their position based on the growing 
number of staff with specific skills and knowledge, able to give 
an interpretation to the results of data analytics. The 
fundamental element of the power of “data barons” is 
represented by the large databases they have. These data silos, 
considered the goldmine of the 21st century, do not have free 
access, as they represent the main or the side-effect of the 
activities realized by their owners, due to the role they play in 
creating, collecting or managing information. 
For this reason, with regard to Big Data, it does not seem so 
easy to imagine the same process of “democratization” that 
happened concerning computer equipment during the 80’s: the 
access to the above mentioned large databases is not only 
protected by legal rights, but it is also strictly related to the 
peculiar positions held by the data holders in their market and 
to the presence of entry barriers. 
Another aspect that characterizes and distinguishes this new 
form of concentration of control over information is given by 
the nature of the purposes of data collection: data processing is 
no longer focused on single users (profiling), but it increased 
by scale and it trying to investigate attitudes and behaviours of 
large groups and communities, up to entire countries. The 
consequence of this large scale approach is the return of the 
fears about social surveillance, which characterized the 
mainframe era. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that this new 
potentially extensive and pervasive social surveillance differs 
from the past, since the modern surveillance is no longer 
realized only by intelligence apparatus, which autonomously 
collects a huge amount of information through pervasive 
monitoring systems. It is the result of the interplay between 
private and public sectors, based on a collaborative model 
made possible by mandatory disclosure orders, which are 
issued by courts or administrative bodies, and extended to an 
undefined pool of voluntary or proactive collaborations from 
big companies.  In this way, governments obtain information 
with the indirect “co-operation” of the users who probably 
would not have given the same information to public entities if 
requested. Service providers for example collect personal data 
on the base of private agreements (privacy policies) with the 
consent of the user and for specific purposes , but governments 
exploit this practice by using mandatory orders to obtain the 
disclosure of this information. This dual mechanism hides from 
citizens the risk and the dimension of the social control that can 
be realized by monitoring social networks or other services and 
using Big Data analytics technologies [32][33][34][35]. 
In this scenario, the traditional data protection framework 
defined in the 90’s goes to crisis [9][36][37], since the new 
technological and economic (i.e. market concentration, social 
and technological lock-ins) context undermined two of its 
fundamental pillars: the purpose limitation principle and the 
“notice and consent” model. 
The purpose limitation principle has its roots in the first 
generations of data protection regulations, since it is strictly 
related to the intention of avoiding extensive data collections, 
which may imply risks in terms of social surveillance and 
control. With the advent of the new generation of data 
protection regulations – during the 80’s and 90’s –, this 
principle not only represented a limit to data processing, but 
also became a key element of the “notice and choice” model, 
since it defines the use of personal information made by data 
controllers that is an important information impacting the 
user’s choice. Nevertheless, the advent of Big Data analytics 
makes it difficult to provide detailed information about the 
purposes of data processing and the expected outputs. Since 
Big Data analytics are designed to extract hidden or 
unpredictable inferences and correlations from datasets, the 
description of these purposes is becoming more and more 
“evanescent”, as a consequence of the “transformative” [38] 
use of Big Data, which makes it often impossible to explain all 
the possible uses of data at the time of its initial collection. 
These critical aspects concerning the purpose limitation 
have a negative impact on the efficiency of the “notice and 
consent” model. First, the difficulty in defining the expected 
results of data processing induces introducing generic and 
vague statements in the notices about the purposes of data 
collection. Second, also in the hypothesis of the adoption of 
long and detailed notices, the complexity of data processing in 
the Big Data environment does not offer to users a real chance 
to understand it and to make their choice. 
Moreover, this scenario is made worse by economic, social 
and technological constraints, which definitively undermine the 
idea of self-determination with regard to personal information 
that represented the core principle of the generation of data 
protection regulations approved during the 80’s and 90’s. As 
mentioned before, we assisted to an increasing concentration of 
the informational assets, due to the multinational or global 
nature of some big players of the new economy, but also due to 
merger and acquisition processes, which created big companies 
both in the online and offline markets. In various cases, mainly 
with regard to online services, these large scale trends 
drastically limit the number of the companies that provide 
specific kind of services, which consequently have hundreds of 
millions of users. This dimension of the dominant players also 
produces social and technological lock-in effects that increase 
2014 ASE BIGDATA/SOCIALCOM/CYBERSECURITY Conference, Stanford University, May 27-31, 2014
©ASE 2014 ISBN: 978-1-62561-000-3 4
 
 
data concentration and represents further direct and indirect 
limitations to user’s self-determination and choice.7  
In the described scenario, characterized by complex data 
processing and concentration of control over information, the 
decision to maintain a model mainly focused on “notice and 
choice” represents a risk, since it is easy for companies to give 
notice and require the consent without an effective self-
determination of users, given the abovementioned reasons.  
This leads us to reconsider the role of user’s self-
determination and to differentiate the situations in which users 
are not able to understand deeply the data processing and its 
purposes, or are not in the position to decide,8 from the other 
different situations in which they can take an actual, free and 
aware decision. With regards to the first hypothesis, there it 
seems to be an analogy between the characters of data 
processing in the Big Data era and what it happened in the 
mainframe age: like at the beginnings of computer age, today, 
data are collected by a limited number of entities and users are 
not able to understand the purposes and methods of data 
processing. In these cases the focus cannot be maintained 
mainly on the user and his or her self-determination: the role of 
users should be reduced and conversely the role of independent 
authorities should be increased. Data protection authorities, 
rather than users, have the technological knowledge to evaluate 
the risks associated to data processing and can adopt legal 
remedies to tackle them. Furthermore, they are also in the best 
position to balance all the different interests of the various 
stakeholders with regard to extensive projects of data 
collection and data mining.9 
                                                          
7 A social lock-in effect is evident in social networks and it is the consequence 
of the dominant position held by some big players, which intrinsically limits 
the user's possibility to recreate the same network elsewhere and, for this 
reasons, it also reduces user’s propensity to change platform and limits their 
chances of not being profiled or tracked. Differently, the technological lock-in 
is related to technological standards and data formats adopted by service 
providers and it limits the data portability and migration from one service to 
another, which offers the same functions. 
8 See also Article 7 (4), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012, 
retrieved February, 28th, 2014 from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (“Consent shall not 
provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a significant imbalance 
between the position of the data subject and the controller”). In 2013, The 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the 
European Parliament has dropped the former Article 7 (4), see Proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation),(COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), 
compromise amendments on Articles 1-29 and on Articles 30-91 (hereinafter 
abbreviated as PGDPR-LIBE), retrieved February, 28th, 2014 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp
_am_art_01-29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf and 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp
_am_art_30-91/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf. 
9 See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Letter from the Article 29 Working 
Party addressed to Google regarding the upcoming change in their privacy 
policy, 2 February 2012, retrieved February, 28th, 2014 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20120202_letter_google_privacy_policy_en.pdf.  
The suggestion is not to change the entire traditional model 
of data protection, but to reshape with regard to the Big Data 
context and the other contexts in which asymmetries in data 
negotiation drastically reduce the role of self-determination. In 
the remaining cases, the “notice and consent” model, as 
traditionally designed, can still be effective, although it needs 
to be reinforced by increasing transparency, service provider’s 
accountability and data protection-oriented architectures.10 
 
5. A Subset of Rules for Big Data and Lock-in 
Situations  
The context described above and the related observations 
suggest defining specific rules for Big Data uses and the 
situations characterized by asymmetries in data negotiation.11 
The necessity to distinguish this area seems not to be felt 
neither by the E.U. legislator, in the proposal for a new data 
protection regulation, nor by the U.S. administration, in the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights [39]. Although the E.U. 
proposal provides various rules that can be useful, it still adopts 
a holistic approach, in which the consent is still “purpose-
limited” and based on the “notice and choice” and the opt-in 
model. 
Conversely, legal scholars and companies propose a 
different approach, which focuses on the use of the data, on the 
likely risks (of benefits and harms) associated with the 
proposed use of the data and on accountability [40]. Although 
this last approach has the undoubted merit to underline the 
crisis of the traditional model and to suggest a solution more 
suitable to address the issues of the existing and future context 
of data processing, nevertheless it offers a holistic solution, but 
this “one solution fits all” approach does not seem to be 
coherent with the different contexts. 
With regard to Big Data context, the new issues should not 
be necessarily addressed by making a choice between a 
“consent based” model and a “corporate accountability” model. 
Although Big Data and lock-in effects drastically limit self-
determination at the moment in which the data are collected, 
the fundamental right of any person to decide about his or her 
own information cannot be erased and users should have the 
right to be informed about data processing and not to take part 
of it. 
In this sense, the model here suggested is the result of the 
past experiences: like in the first regulations, the decision about 
data processing cannot be left to users, but at the same time 
user’s rights to oppose to data processing and not to have 
personal data collected – codified in data protection laws 
during the 90’s – should be preserved.  
The fundamental pillars of this model are the adoption of 
the “opt-out” scheme and the definition of a rigorous data 
protection assessment, which should be publicly available. 
With regard to the latter, the same approach that is used in the 
                                                          
10 See Articles 13a, 23, 32a, 33, 33a, 34, 35, 39, PGDPR-LIBE. 
11 For this reason, the following paragraphs will leave aside the cases in which 
users are able to understand the purposes of data collection and data 
processing, where the existing “notice and choice” and “purpose limited” 
consent can be kept valid. 
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field of product security and liability (e.g. drugs authorization) 
should be extended to data processing:  in presence of complex 
data processing systems or data collections influenced by lock-
in effects, the risk and benefit assessment should not be done 
by users, but it should be made by companies, under the 
supervision of data protection authorities. Users should only 
decide to give their information or, when the data have already 
been collected, to exercise or not their right to opt-out. 
In this model, companies intend to adopt a strategy based 
on Big Data should conduct an assessment of its impact on data 
protection, social surveillance and discrimination, in order to 
adopt all the adequate measures and standards to reduce it. This 
assessment, as in clinical trials, should be conducted by third 
parties and supervised by data protection authorities, which 
should also define the professional requirements of these third 
parties. Once the assessment is approved by data protection 
authorities, the process should be considered secure in terms of 
protection of personal information and risks of social 
surveillance and, for this reason, companies can enlist all users 
in the specific data processing, without any prior consent, but 
giving them a previous notice that mentions the results of the 
assessment12 and providing them the opt-out option. 
Obviously the entire system works only if the political and 
financial autonomy of data protection authorities, both from 
governments and corporations, is guaranteed. For this reason, it 
would be preferable if a model based on mandatory fees, paid 
by companies when they submit their requests of authorization 
to data protection authorities, could be adopted. This will give 
autonomous resources to authorities, related to their activities, 
without being influenced by the entities under their 
surveillance. 
At the same time, in this model, independent authorities 
assume an important role in balancing all the different 
implications of data processing, not only in terms of data 
security but also in terms of social impact and ethical use of 
data. Conversely, a different assessment exclusively based on 
the adoption of security standards or corporate self-regulation 
would not have the same extent and independency. This does 
not mean that forms of standardization or co-regulation cannot 
be adopted [41]; nevertheless, the proposed reduction of the 
role of user’s self-determination should have a necessary 
counterbalance in the active role of public and independent 
authorities acting in the interest of the whole society. 
This model should offer clear and public procedures for 
assessment. These, undoubtedly, represent an economic burden 
for companies; nevertheless, in case of positive evaluation of 
data processing plans, these procedures allow companies to use 
data for complex and multiple purposes, without the 
inconvenience of acquiring a specific opt-in choice every time 
data are used for new purposes. Companies should only inform 
users about any changes and give them the chance to opt-out. 
                                                          
12 The notice should also describe how to access to the impact assessment 
report. This report is a short version of the documentation related to the 
assessment and it does not contain corporate sensitive information, in order to 
balance trade secrets and publicity of the assessment.  Nevertheless, in 
presence of litigations, courts or data protection authorities may have access 
to the complete documentation and may disclose it to the compliant. 
From the user’s point of view, on the one hand, the 
assessment conducted by the data protection authorities gives 
them a guarantee of an effective evaluation of the risks related 
to data processing and, on the other hand, the opt-out allows 
them to receive information about data processing and to 
decide if they do not want to be part of the data collection. 
 
6. Conclusions  
All the ongoing proposals for a reform of data protection 
regulations, both in the U.S. and Europe, are still focused on 
the traditional main pillars of data protection laws, which are 
represented by the purpose limitation principle and the “notice 
and choice” model. This approach is inadequate in the present 
Big Data context, where the complexity of data processing and 
the power of modern analytics drastically limit the awareness 
of data subjects, their capability to evaluate the consequences 
of their choices and their free and informed consent. Moreover, 
the “transformative” use of personal information (e.g. Big 
Data) often makes it impossible to give the description of all 
the possible uses of the data at the time of its initial collection.  
For these reasons, a revision of the “notice and choice” 
model, which is focused on the opt-in, is necessary. In this 
light, this paper proposes the adoption of a different approach 
when, such as in Big Data context, the data subject cannot be 
totally aware of the tools of analysis and their potential output.  
In the proposed model, companies that intend to adopt 
strategies based on Big Data with regard to personal 
information should conduct an assessment of the impact of 
these strategies on data protection, in order to adopt all the 
adequate measures and standards to reduce the potential 
negative effects on individuals and the risks of social 
surveillance. Once the assessment is approved, the data 
processing should be considered secure in terms of protection 
of personal information and risks of social surveillance. For 
this reason, companies can subsequently enroll their users in 
the data processing, giving them the opt-out option.  
In this model, data protection authorities play a central role 
in considering all the different implications of data processing, 
not only in terms of data security but also of social impact and 
ethical use of information, since the proposed reduction of the 
role played by user’s self-determination should have a 
counterbalance in the active role played by public and 
independent authorities. 
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